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Abstract
We construct a language extension for process calculi for modelling the exchange of cryptographically
composed data. More speciﬁcally, we devise a succinct syntax for terms and patterns that captures the
intention behind perfect cryptography. The proposed language extension is independent of the choice of
process calculus and is applicable to any calculus that supports exchange of data. Initially we restrict the
model to symmetric cryptography, but we also show how it can be extended with support for asymmetric
encryption and digital signatures.
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1 Introduction
The modelling of security protocols often relies on process calculi. As a common
method for ensuring security in a system is the application of cryptography, several
process calculi have emerged which incorporates cryptography in the design, e.g.
LySa [3,4] and the Spi-calculus [1]. However, the modelling of cryptography and
the underlying communication model are orthogonal factors in the resulting system,
and this motivates an independent development of these components.
In this paper we shall design a language extension for process calculi that allows
for modelling the use of cryptographic operations for securing the exchange of data.
Speciﬁcally, we develop a term language with pattern matching that captures the
intention behind perfect cryptography in an intuitive and succinct manner. The
design is independent of the underlying communication model, and the language
extension can be applied to any process calculus that supports exchange of data.
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We shall develop the language extension in two phases. In Section 2 we present
the formal foundation of our model for extending a calculus with support for cryp-
tography. Initially we restrict our attention to symmetric encryption, as this suﬃces
for introducing the general concepts and eases readability. However, the model is
easily extendable with other cryptographic primitives, and in Section 3 we shall see
how to deal with asymmetric cryptography. It turns out that asymmetric cryptog-
raphy introduces new requirements to the model that the language extension must
cater for. Essentially, asymmetric cryptography allows for a new scenario, namely
that a principal can decrypt a message without being able to recreate the message
by encryption.
To illustrate the use of the pattern matching primitive we show in Section 4 how
to formulate diﬀerent security protocols and in Section 5 we shall recapitulate and
reﬂect upon our contribution. Finally, in Appendix A we show the validity of our
language extension with respect to the principles of perfect cryptography.
2 Design
2.1 Syntax
The basic building blocks used for modelling cryptography are terms and patterns.
The syntax for these are listed in Table 1 where N and V denote the disjoint sets
of names and variables, respectively.
t ::= n Name (n ∈ N )
| x Variable (x ∈ V)
| T(t1, · · · , tk) Tuple
| Et0(t) Shared Key Encryption
p ::= t  [x1, · · · , xk] Pattern
Table 1
Syntax for terms and patterns.
The syntax for terms bears similarities to LySa. Names are used for describing
all basic elements such as text, nonces, symmetric keys or time stamps. Variables
can be mapped during execution, and may hold both names and composite terms.
The tuple construct T(t1, · · · , tk) is used for concatenation of terms and ﬁnally the
construct Et0(t) denotes symmetric encryption of a term t using the key t0. In the
following we shall often refer to a closed term, that is a term with no variables, as
a value (v ∈ Val).
The other basic building block is patterns. As mentioned already, patterns are
used to match on terms. Hence the syntax for patterns is identical to the syntax for
terms, except that a pattern includes a list of the variables that should be mapped
within the term.
Example 2.1 Assume the existence of a matching operator  for matching a value
v against a pattern p, written v  p. Such a construct should be used upon input
or decryption in a process calculus, and the general idea is then that a process
vp in P ﬁrst veriﬁes that v matches p; if this is the case the continuation process P
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is updated with any newly mapped variables, and executed, otherwise the execution
will be blocked.
The matching T(n,m)  T(y,m)  [y] in P should succeed because the tuple
T(n,m) matches T(y,m). This results in the mapping of the variable y to the name
n in the continuation process P . The matching T(n,m)  T(y, y)  [y] in P on the
other hand would not succeed as both n and m cannot match the pattern y, and
thus further execution is garbled.
2.2 Semantics
Having presented the syntax of the model we shall now deﬁne a semantics. We rely
on reduction semantics, and assume that a similar semantics exists for the calculus
to be extended.
As reduction semantics is only concerned with closed processes, it is clear that
the semantics of terms are merely values. The semantics of pattern matching on
the other hand, must record all new mappings of variables. Formally, the semantics
needs to produce an environment
θ : V → Val
that maps the variables in the matching to their respective value. We shall write [ ]
for the empty mapping and θ[x → v] for the mapping that is like θ except it maps
x to v. Furthermore we deﬁne an equality operator for mappings
.
= as
θ1
.
= θ2 iﬀ ∀x ∈ (dom(θ1) ∩ dom(θ2)) : θ1(x) = θ2(x)
The equality operator
.
= ensures that if a variable is mapped in both environments
then these mappings are equal, i.e. the variable is mapped to the same value in
both environments. Thus we can unambiguously unify two environments, θ1 ∪ θ2,
whenever θ1
.
= θ2.
The judgement for the semantics of pattern matching takes the form  v  p : θ
and states that the value v correctly matches the pattern p, giving rise to the vari-
able mappings θ. This is captured by the deﬁnition in Table 2. The deﬁnition
simply requires an auxiliary judgement for decomposition X  v  t : θ to be satis-
ﬁed, which ensures that the value v matches the term t giving rise to the variable
mappings in θ, assuming the variables to be mapped are all included the set X . The
semantics assumes that all sub-patterns are matched in parallel and ensures that
possible multiple mappings of variables are equal using the
.
= operator. Whenever
a value v is matched against a variable x we use the rule (Bind), where the resulting
environment is the mapping of x to v. As the semantics is deﬁned as a reduction
semantics, we know that all variables that have been mapped prior to the pattern
matching are already replaced by their corresponding values. Thus the rule (Bind)
only requires the variable x to belong to the list of variables to be deﬁned in the
matching, X . Symmetric decryption (SDec) simply requires both the key and the
content to match the pattern, and tuples (Tup) require all sub-patterns to match.
The resulting environment θ of a pattern matching is supposed to be used to
update a possible continuation process with the new mappings of variables that the
matching resulted in.
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(Match)
X  v  t : θ
 v  t  X : θ
(Name) X  n n : [ ] (Bind)
x ∈ X
X  v  x : [x → v]
(SDec)
X  v0  t0 : θ0 X  v  t : θ θ0
.
= θ
X  Ev0 (v)  Et0 (t) : θ0 ∪ θ
(Tup)
X  v1  t1 : θ1 · · · X  vk  tk : θk
X  T(v1, · · · , vk) T(t1, · · · , tk) : θ1 ∪ · · · ∪ θk
if ∀i, j : θi
.
= θj
Table 2
Semantics of pattern matching;  v  p : θ and X  v  t : θ.
2.3 Well-formedness
The syntax and semantics of our language extension does not enforce the usual
assumption of perfect cryptography. Matching on a pattern such as Ex(y)  [x, y]
obviously violates this assumption, as it allows for learning x based only on an
encrypted message. This design choice has been made to make the model as ﬂexible
as possible, one may want to encode the possibility of a principal to guess certain
keys or encrypted contents in order to analyse diﬀerent attack scenarios. Perfect
cryptography is only one such scenario, although the most commonly used one,
and thus we shall design a well-formedness condition for enforcing this assumption,
hereby allowing the protocol analyst to choose when this criteria should apply.
In order to design a well-formedness requirement we shall assume the existence
of the sets of deﬁned names N and deﬁned variables V. Each element in these
sets are supposed to be deﬁned prior to the pattern matching, and thus for a given
term we shall simply require all names and variables used within the term to belong
to the sets N and V, respectively. For this we shall assume the existence of the
function for ﬁnding free names fn and free variables fv in a term, deﬁned in the usual
manner. The resulting well-formedness condition for terms is given as judgement
(N ,V)  t in Table 3.
The requirement for patterns is more subtle as we must ensure that the pat-
terns enforce the rules of perfect cryptography. We approach this challenge by
ﬁrst noticing that perfect cryptography is violated whenever we cannot sort the
list X of variables to be learnt, such that the ﬁrst variable can be learnt with-
out knowledge of the remaining variables, learning the second variable requires at
most knowledge of the ﬁrst variable, etc. One example of this could be the pattern
T(Ey(x),Ex(y))  [x, y], where neither x can be learnt without knowledge of y nor y
without knowledge of x. This means that we can require the list of variables to be
deﬁned X to be ordered, without limiting the model.
Now, assuming an ordered list of variables, we must have a method of detecting
whether the variables one by one can be learnt correctly from in the pattern. We
achieve this goal by introducing an auxiliary judgement (N ,V)  t ∼ x for validating
that the variable x can be learnt from the term t strictly following the cryptographic
rules and given the set of known namesN and variables V. The judgement is deﬁned
straightforwardly, the variable x is obviously learnt legally from the term x. If the
term is composite, a recursive search is initiated; in a tuple at least one of the sub-
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terms must provide knowledge of x, and a cryptographic construction should only
allow x to be learnt from the contents, if the key consists of purely known names
and variables.
(WT)
fn(t) ⊆ N fv(t) ⊆ V
(N ,V)  t
(WPDef)
x /∈ V (N ,V)  t ∼ x (N ,V ∪ {x})  t  X
(N ,V)  t  (x :: X )
(WPEmp)
(N ,V)  t
(N ,V)  t  [ ]
(WH1) (N ,V)  x ∼ x (WH2)
fv(t0) ⊆ V fn(t0) ⊆ N (N ,V)  t ∼ x
(N ,V)  Et0 (t) ∼ x
(WH3)
(N ,V)  ti ∼ x
(N ,V)  T(t1, · · · , tk) ∼ x
1 ≤ i ≤ k
Table 3
Well-formedness of terms and patterns; (N ,V)  t, (N ,V)  p and (N ,V)  t ∼ x.
The auxiliary judgement allows for deﬁning a well-formedness condition for pat-
terns. This condition relies on the set of deﬁned names N , the set of deﬁned
variables V and the ordered list of the variables that should be deﬁned in the pat-
tern X . If X is not empty the rule (WPDef) applies, where the ﬁrst element x of X ,
i.e. the next variable to be deﬁned, is checked to be a fresh variable x /∈ V and then
validated that it can be learnt correctly from the term by (N ,V)  t ∼ x. If this is
fulﬁlled, the variable x can safely be added to the set of known variables and the
next variable in the list can be checked. At some point the list X will be empty, in
this case the rule (WPEmp) applies which merely establishes that t is a well-formed
term given the sets of now known variables V and names N .
In order to fully understand the need for and the workings of the well-formedness
condition, consider the following example.
Example 2.2 Consider these entirely legal patterns:
(1) EK(x)  [x] where K ∈ N
(2) Ex(y)  [y] where x ∈ V
(3) T(Ey(x),Ez(y), z)  [z, y, x]
In (1) the new variable x is learnt by decryption with K, an already known name.
Similarly in (2) y is learnt using the prior knowledge of x to decrypt the encryption.
In (3) z can be learnt from the third element of the tuple, then the second part of
the tuple can be decrypted using z hereby learning y, and ﬁnally from the ﬁrst part
of the tuple x can be learnt using y.
All of the above patterns follow the cryptographic rules and are correctly ac-
cepted by our well-formedness condition. But now see how small alterations of
the patterns above change them into patterns with unwanted properties that are
correctly disqualiﬁed by the well-formedness condition.
(1′) Ex(K)  [x] where K ∈ N
(1′′) EK(K)  [x] where K ∈ N
(2′) Ex(y)  [x, y]
(3′) T(Ey(x),Ex(y))  [x, y]
(3′′) T(Ey(x),Ez(y), z)  [x, y, z]
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The pattern (1′) is illegal as either x ∈ V and the deﬁnition is a renaming which is
not allowed, or else x is not previously deﬁned, meaning that x is learnt from a key,
thus violating perfect cryptography and not satisfying (V)  p ∼ x. In pattern (1′′)
we simply can’t learn x from the pattern and in (2′) x is again only learnt based
on a key. In (3′) x cannot be learnt without prior knowledge of y (and y cannot
be learnt without knowledge of x) and in (3′′) x cannot be learnt without prior
knowledge of y (reverse deﬁnition order of (3)).
3 Extending the Model
We shall now show how the model presented in Section 2, hereafter referred to as
the basic model, can be extended with diﬀerent cryptographic operations. We do
this by extending it with asymmetric cryptography, as this extension introduces
some interesting new aspects that our model must cater for.
Extending the model with asymmetric cryptography opens for scenarios where
a principal can decompose a term but cannot recreate this term afterwards. This
is exempliﬁed by digital signatures, where a principal that receives a signed value
may be able to learn the signed content by decrypting it with the signer’s public
key, but cannot reproduce this signed value itself because it does not know the
signer’s private key. This introduces complications when modelling protocols where
a principal receives a value, veriﬁes that it is signed by the expected principal,
and forwards it to a receiver. To cater for this, we shall extend our model with
a capability for enforcing restrictions on the values a variable may be mapped to.
With such an extension, the example mentioned here could be modelled by letting
the principal bind the incoming value to a variable x, if and only if it is signed
by the expected principal, and then forward the value that x is mapped to, to the
receiver.
3.1 Syntax
As already described, we shall extend the syntax of our model to allow restrictions
of the mappings of variables. We do this by introducing a new syntactic element s
which we call a sieve. Sieves express the restrictions under which we allow a variable
to be mapped, and we write x → s for deﬁning the variable x which is allowed to
be mapped to any value v that matches the sieve s.
The resulting syntax for terms, sieves and patterns is given in Table 4. Here we
annotate names with a tag τ ∈ {,+,−} for modelling whether the name is a public
key n+ or a private key n− as part of a key pair, or if it is just a regular name
n. Public key encryption is modelled using the construct Pt0(t), and as usually we
shall model digital signatures by encryption using a private key.
Sieves are supposed to match on terms and thus the syntax is merely terms
extended with a wildcard  for a sieve that matches everything, i.e. variables deﬁned
with the sieve  correspond to the variables of the basic model. Notice that sieves
allow for both recursive variable deﬁnitions and for deﬁning variables based on the
mappings to other variables. Recursive variable deﬁnitions such as in the pattern x
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t ::= nτ Name (nτ ∈ N , τ ∈ {,+,−})
| x Variable (x ∈ V)
| T(t1, · · · , tk) Tuple
| Et0 (t) Shared key encryption
| Pt0 (t) Public key encryption
s ::= t Restrictive sieve
|  Non− restrictive sieve
p ::= t  [x1 → s1, · · · , xk → sk] Pattern
Table 4
Revised syntax.
[x → T(x, x)] would in this pattern matching context never match any values, as we
do not allow remapping of variables. Thus such sieves should be prohibited by a well-
formedness condition. Deﬁning variables based on other variables however, provides
a useful tool when describing protocols, e.g. the pattern x  [x → Pn−(y), y → ]
allows for both binding a signed value and the value itself to some variables, in one
pattern matching.
The deﬁning list of variables [x1 → s1, · · · , xk → sk] in the pattern, can be seen
as an environment Γ, which maps the variables to be deﬁned to their respective
sieve:
Γ : V → {s | s deﬁned in Table 4}
This allows for a simpler deﬁnition of the semantics.
3.2 Semantics
The judgement for the semantics still takes the form  v  p : θ but requires an
auxiliary judgement on the form Γ  v t : θ to be satisﬁed, which states that given
the environment Γ that maps the variables to their corresponding sieve, then the
value v matches the term t, giving rise to the variable mappings of θ. Both of these
judgements are deﬁned in Table 5.
The semantics is closely related to the semantics for the basic model, but the
auxiliary judgement includes a few more rules. The rules (RPDec) and (RSign) for
asymmetric decryption and validation of digital signatures are similar to symmetric
decryption, except we ensure that the keys are tagged as required and that they
belong to a key pair. When matching a value v against a variable x one of the rules
(RBind1) and (RBind2) applies, depending on x’s sieve. In the case of a restrictive
sieve t the rule (RBind1) is used, this requires the value v to match t, and provided
this matching gives rise to the environment θ then θ is updated with the mapping
of x to v. In the case of a non-restrictive sieve  the rule (RBind2) applies, which
merely returns the environment that maps x to v.
3.3 Well-formedness
In Table 6 we deﬁne the well-formedness condition for the language extension with
asymmetric cryptography. The well-formedness condition of terms is analogous to
the one in the basic model.
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(RMatch)
Γ  v  t : θ
 v  t  Γ : θ
(RName) Γ  nτ  nτ : [ ] (RSDec)
Γ  v0  t0 : θ0 Γ  v  t : θ θ0
.
= θ
Γ  Ev0 (v)  Et0 (t) : θ0 ∪ θ
(RBind1)
Γ(x) = t Γ  v  t : θ
Γ  v  x : θ[x → v]
(RPDec)
Γ  n−  t0 : θ0 Γ  v  t : θ θ0
.
= θ
Γ  Pn+ (v)  Pt0(t) : θ0 ∪ θ
(RBind2)
Γ(x) = 
Γ  v  x : [x → v]
(RSign)
Γ  n+  t0 : θ0 Γ  v  t : θ θ0
.
= θ
Γ  Pn− (v)  Pt0(t) : θ0 ∪ θ
(RTup)
Γ  v1  t1 : θ1 · · · Γ  vk  tk : θk
Γ  T(v1, · · · , vk) T(t1, · · · , tk) : θ1 ∪ · · · ∪ θk
if ∀i, j : θi
.
= θj
Table 5
Revised semantics of pattern matching;  v  p : θ and Γ  v  t : θ.
Well-formedness of patterns still requires an auxiliary judgement (N ,V)  p ∼ x
for determining if a variable x can be learnt correctly from a term t given knowledge
of the names N and variables V, this is deﬁned deﬁned analogous to the auxiliary
judgement in the basic model.
(RWT)
fn(t) ⊆ N fv(t) ⊆ V
(N ,V)  t
(RWDef1)
x /∈ V x /∈ dom(Γ) (N ,V)  t[t′/x]  Γ
(N ,V)  t  ((x → t′) :: Γ)
(RWDef2)
x /∈ V (N ,V)  t ∼ x (N ,V ∪ {x})  t  Γ
(N ,V)  t  ((x → ) :: Γ)
(RWEmp)
(N ,V)  t
(N ,V)  t  [ ]
(RWH1) (N ,V)  x ∼ x
(RWH2)
fv(t0) ⊆ V fn(t0) ⊆ N (N ,V)  t ∼ x
(N ,V)  Et0(t) ∼ x
(RWH3)
fv(t0) ⊆ V fn(t0) ⊆ N (N ,V)  t ∼ x
(N ,V)  Pt0 (t) ∼ x
(RWH4)
(N ,V)  ti ∼ x
(N ,V)  T(t1, · · · , tk) ∼ x
1 ≤ i ≤ k
Table 6
Revised well-formedness of terms and patterns; (N ,V)  t, (N ,V)  p and (N ,V)  t ∼ x.
The well-formedness of patterns itself is on the form (N ,V)  p stating that the
pattern p is well-formed under the assumption of known sets of names N and vari-
ables V. This is captured by three rules. The rule (RWDef1) shows that a variable
deﬁned with a restrictive sieve t′ is checked to be fresh x /∈ V and also required
not to be deﬁned repeatedly x /∈ dom(Γ); if this is fulﬁlled the rule merely replace
x by its corresponding sieve t′ in the pattern t. This reﬂects the observation, that
variables deﬁned by a restrictive sieve, i.e. a term, merely establishes a shorthand
for this term. This means that the mappings of these variables rely solely on the
mappings of other variables, and to validate well-formedness, we must validate the
variable mappings within the structure of these variables instead of the mappings
of the variables themselves. This also reduces the well-formedness requirement to
rely exclusively on the variables deﬁned with non-restrictive sieves , similarly to
the basic model. The rule (RWDef2) is therefore analogous to the rule for deﬁned
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variables in the basic model.
Notice that, although there are no explicit requirement to the restrictive sieve
t in the rule (RWDef1), the recursiveness of the deﬁnition enforces that the sieve
only holds known names, and that free variables are either known or deﬁned in the
matching. Furthermore, the deﬁnition ensures that there are no cyclic dependencies
such as t  [x → y, y → x], as these deﬁnitions, after repeated application of rule
(RWDef1), result in a term that includes variables not in V, i.e. in the pattern
mentioned here both x and y will be replaced by their corresponding sieves but not
included in V, and thus the pattern will be rejected.
The examples of how well-formedness ensures that perfect cryptography is en-
forced in the basic model presented in Example 2.2, naturally also apply to the
extended model. The extended model however, introduces new ways to circumvent
perfect cryptography, and the following example shows how the well-formedness
condition presented above also captures these.
Example 3.1 The following patterns are all legal:
(1) y  [y → Pm− (x), x → ] where m
− ∈ N
(2) T(Ex(z), y)  [x → y, y → , z → ]
(3) T(x, z)  [x → Py(y), y → z, z → ]
In (1) the sieve for y is Pm−(x) and replacing y with this in the term shows that
we afterwards can learn x, since the private key m− is known. In (2), we see that
by replacing x with its corresponding sieve y, we get a pattern where we legally can
learn y and then decrypt the encryption and learn z. Notice that the deﬁnition list
[y → , x → y, z → ] would also be legal as y could be learnt prior to replacing x,
although this encoding seems less intuitive. Finally in (3) we ﬁrst replace x with
the sieve Py(y), then y with z, resulting in T(Pz(z), z) which is an obviously legal
pattern, and would for instance match a value on the form T(Pn−(n
+), n+).
Again we can render these patterns illegal by modifying them slightly. The
following patterns are all correctly disqualiﬁed by the well-formedness condition:
(1′) y  [y → Pm− (x), x → ] where m
− /∈ N
(2′) T(Ex(z), y)  [x → , y → x, z → ]
(3′) T(x, z)  [x → y, y → x, z → ]
The pattern (1′) is illegal as it includes an unknown name, m− /∈ N . In pattern
(2′) the sieve for x and y are changed such that y depends on x instead, but the
now reverse deﬁnition order means that we cannot learn x prior to substituting y
with its pattern. Notice however that if we deﬁne y before x, the pattern becomes
legal. Pattern (3′) deﬁnes x to depend on y and y to depend on x, obviously this is
illegal, and it will also be disqualiﬁed as ﬁrst substituting x with y and then y with
x results in the pattern T(x, z) in which x is undeﬁned, i.e. the resulting term is
not well-formed as x /∈ V.
4 Modelling
In this section we will give some examples on how to use the proposed language
extension to model security protocols. As the proposed extension is supposed to be
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applicable to a large variety of process calculi, we cannot assume anything about the
underlying semantics of the communication model. Instead, we shall formalise the
protocol in an extended protocol narration [3], where we distinguish between outputs
and corresponding inputs, and between encryptions and corresponding decryptions.
In the encodings we follow [3] and extend each sent message with source and
destination information as the ﬁrst two elements, simulating the IP address along
the lines of IPv4 and IPv6. Upon receipt of a message the principal will always
check whether the message is intended for it; occasionally it will also check that the
sender is who it expected.
For readability we shall employ the notational convention of x instead of the
more cumbersome x →  and also omit the tuple construct as this obviously can be
added automatically by a parser.
4.1 Wide Mouthed Frog
The Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [6] is a symmetric key protocol, for establishing
a short term key K between two principals A and B, who both trust a server S. In
our modelling we shall consider the following version [1]:
1. A → S : A,EKA (B,K)
2. S → B : EKB (A,K)
3. A → B : EK(msg)
Here KA and KB are master keys that A and B, respectively, are assumed to share
with the server S. The key K is the session key that A and B shares after completion
of the protocol, such that they in the last step can communicate the message msg
encrypted.
This protocol is a commonly used example because of its simplicity and it is also,
since it only uses symmetric encryption, a well-suited choice for the basic model. As
described above, we shall formulate the protocol in an extended protocol narration
and for this we use the patterns and the matching operator . A direct translation
into an extended protocol narration in the style of [3] looks as follows:
1. A → : A,S,A,EKA(B, K)
1′. → S : xA, S, xA, x  [xA, x]
1′′. S : x EKxA (xB , xK)  [xB, xK ]
2. S → : S,B,EKxB (A,K)
2′. → B : yS , B, y  [yS , y]
2′′. B : y  EKB (yA, yK)  [yA, yK ]
3. A → : A,B,EK(msg)
3′. → B : yA, B, y
′  [y′]
3′′. B : y′  EK(ymsg)  [ymsg ]
Each line in the simple Alice-Bob protocol narration, has been translated into three
lines in the extended narration. The ﬁrst line describes the actions of the sender, the
second line then describe how the recipient inputs the message, and the third line
describes how the recipient decrypts some of the received elements using pattern
matching. Notice that this encoding assumes that the distributed key K is fresh,
and that S knows the master key of A and B, called KA and KB respectively.
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However, this encoding can be optimised as all the decryptions can be incorpo-
rated into the input patterns directly. And the resulting narration looks as follows:
1. A → : A,S,A,EKA(B, K)
1′. → S : xA, S, xA,EKxA (xB , xK)  [xA, xB, xK ]
2. S → : S,B,EKxB (A,K)
2′. → B : yS , B,EKB (yA, yK)  [yS , yA, yK ]
3. A → : A,B,EK(msg)
3′. → B : yA, B,EK(ymsg)  [ymsg]
This optimised encoding is as detailed about the actions of the participants as the
former encoding, but the readability is much higher. It is also noticeable that this
encoding uses less variables, as it is not necessary to store temporary values in
temporary variables.
4.2 ISO Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol
The ISO protocols were proposed in Part 3 of the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard [8].
These protocols use asymmetric cryptography for authentication, and thus they are
all good choices for the extended model. We have chosen to model the three-pass
version, which in [7] is formalised as follows:
1. B → A : B,Rb, T1
2. A → B : CertA,Ra, Rb, B, T3,P
K
−
A
(Ra, Rb, B, T2)
3. B → A : CertB,Rb, Ra, A, T5,P
K
−
B
(Rb,Ra, A, T4)
The protocol authenticates A and B to each other. Apart from the nonces Ra
and Rb and the text ﬁelds T1 − T5, the protocol relies on the certiﬁcates CertA
and CertB. These certiﬁcates are supposed to be generated by a trusted certiﬁcate
authority CA, and usually include the name of the certiﬁcate authority, the name
of the certiﬁed principal and its public key, all signed by the certiﬁcate authority’s
private key. Hence A’s certiﬁcate for instance is directly translated into our syntax
as PK−
CA
(A,CA,K+A ), and when B receives A’s certiﬁcate in step 2, he will be able
to learn A’s public key and thereby ensure that the last part of the message is
actually signed by A.
When modelling this protocol, we must also model the distribution of the cer-
tiﬁcates, as these should originate from the certiﬁcate authority. Thus the resulting
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extended protocol narration will look as follows:
0A. CA → : PK−
CA
(A,CA,K+
A
)
0′A. → A : xcert  [xcert → PK+
CA
(A,CA,K+
A
)]
0B . CA → : PK−
CA
(B,CA,K+
B
)
0′
B
. → B : ycert  [ycert → PK+
CA
(B,CA,K+
B
)]
1. B → : B,Rb, T1
1′. → A : xB , xRb, xT1  [xB, xRB , xT1]
2. A → : xcert, Ra, xRb, B, T3,PK+
A
(Ra, xRb, B, T2)
2′. → B : P
K
+
CA
(A,CA, y
K
+
A
), yRa, Rb, B, yT3,Py
K
+
A
(yRa, Rb, B, yT2)
 [y
K
+
A
, yRa, yT3, yT2]
3. B → : ycert, Rb, yRa, A, T5,PK+
B
(Rb, yRa, A, T4)
3′. → A : P
K
+
CA
(B,CA, x
K
+
B
), xRb, Ra, A, xT5,Px
K
+
B
(xRb, Ra, A, xT4)
 [y
K
+
A
, yT5, yT4]
The encoding assumes that both A and B trust CA, and that they both know
its public key K+CA. The ﬁrst 4 lines then describe the distribution of the certiﬁ-
cates, and it important to observe that A and B can only verify that the certiﬁcate
is authentic but not recreate it themselves, and they therefore have to use the re-
strictive sieves to ensure that they only accept a correct certiﬁcate. The remaining
part of the encoding is relatively trivial, note however that the patterns in 2′ and 3′
allow the receiver to learn the public key of the sender prior to decrypting the last
encrypted part of the tuple, and this allows for the patterns to be well-formed.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an expressive syntax, general semantics and a notion
of well-formedness for capturing the assumptions of perfect cryptography. The
extended syntax builds on and reﬁnes ideas that can be found in the Spi-calculus,
in LySa and in LySaNS [5] in order to express patterns that enable to learn a number
of secrets from a single transmitted message, as is common in security protocols.
The formal development has taken the form of deﬁning a semantics that can
also deal with imperfect cryptography (as when secret keys can be broken by brute
force attack or successful guessing) which has been supplemented by general well-
formedness conditions for ruling out those behaviours not allowed when assuming
perfect cryptography.
The theo-rems es-tab-lis-hed in Ap-pendix A aim at show-ing that the well-
formedness conditions are suﬃciently restrictive that no improper behaviour is
admitted; the example protocols modelled in Section 4 aim at showing that the
well-formedness conditions are suﬃciently ﬂexible to be of widespread interest.
Clearly there is more to a process calculus than the modelling of cryptography,
but as we already said in the introduction, we believe the other features to be
somewhat orthogonal to this. We are currently working [9] on embedding the ideas
exposed here into the process calculus Klaim [2] that deals with communication
by means of distributed tuple spaces - so far without any surprises. Future work
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involves showing that this development can also be integrated with the calculi for
service-orientation and orchestration developed in the Sensoria project.
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A Validating the Design
In this appendix we shall show some important properties of our language extension.
The ﬁrst is that well-formedness is preserved in the semantics, and the second that
a well-formed pattern guarantees perfect cryptography. As was the case for the
development of the language extension, we shall proceed in two phases. First we
shall prove that the results apply to the basic model, and then using the same proof
technique we shall extend the results to the extended model.
A.1 Basic Model
That well-formedness is preserved in the semantics, is captured by Proposition A.1.
Proposition A.1 If  v  p : θ and (N ,V)  v then it follows that also ∀x ∈
dom(θ) : (N ,V)  θx.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction in the deﬁnition of X  v  t : θ where
each case follows directly from the induction hypothesis. 
Notice that the result does not require the pattern to be well-formed but only the
value, as well-formed patterns only enforce the assumption of perfect cryptography.
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This leads us to the next and less trivial property, namely that well-formed patterns
enforce the assumption of perfect cryptography.
We shall prove this result by ﬁrst introducing a principal I that plays according
to the rules of perfect cryptography. Formally, we shall deﬁne I’s knowledge I(K)
as listed in Table A.1. Here rule (I1) shows that I has some initial knowledge K.
(I1)
t ∈ K fv(t) = ∅
t ∈ I(K)
(I2)
T(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ I(K)
t1, . . . , tk ∈ I(K)
(I3)
Et0 (t) ∈ I(K) t0 ∈ I(K)
t ∈ I(K)
(I4)
t1, . . . , tk ∈ I(K)
T(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ I(K)
(I5)
t0, t ∈ I(K)
Et0 (t) ∈ I(K)
Table A.1
The knowledge of I; I(K).
It can extend its knowledge by decomposing the values according to perfect cryp-
tography (rules (I2) and (I3)), i.e. decrypting using known keys and decomposing
tuples. Furthermore, I has the ability to construct new values from its knowledge
by concatenating known values into new tuples and creating new encryptions from
known keys and contents (rules (I4) and (I5)).
Apart from the knowledge of the principal I, we must also keep track of the
variable mappings that I knows. We do this by introducing a mapping Θ deﬁned
analogous to θ. Given these ingredients we now deﬁne that a pattern p guarantees
perfect cryptography if and only if allowing I to use pattern matching of any value
v ∈ I(K) against p would never produce variable mappings not already in I(K).
More formally we have:
Deﬁnition A.2 The pattern t  X guarantees perfect cryptography if and only if
for all v and Θ where (fv(t)\X ) ⊆ dom(Θ), range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) and v ∈ I(K) then
X  v  (Θt) : θ implies range(θ) ⊆ I(K).
This provides us with a concrete requirement for patterns to guarantee perfect
cryptography, which we now must prove is ensured by the well-formedness condition.
First we shall state some facts which clariﬁes the proofs. All of the facts follow
directly from straightforward induction and we shall therefore omit the proofs.
Fact A.3 If X  v  t : θ then dom(θ) ⊆ X .
Fact A.4 If X  v  t : θ where fn(t) ⊆ I(K) and fv(t) = [ ] then v ∈ I(K).
Fact A.5 If (x :: X )  v t : θ and x ∈ dom(θ) then X  v t[θx/x] : θ\{x → θx}.
Before we proceed to main result itself, we need an auxiliary result, namely that
(N ,V)  t ∼ x is only satisﬁed if x can be learnt from t without violating perfect
cryptography.
Lemma A.6 The judgement (N ,V)  t ∼ x ensures that for all v and Θ where
V ⊆ dom(Θ), x /∈ dom(Θ), v ∈ I(K) and N∪ range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) then X  v(Θt) : θ
implies x ∈ dom(θ) and θx ∈ I(K)
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction in the structure of X  v (Θt) : θ, where
the interesting cases are (Bind) and (SDec):
Case (Bind). Assuming that X  vx : [x → v] by (Bind) because x ∈ X , the result
follows directly from the assumption v ∈ I(K).
Case (SDec). Assume that X  Ev0(v1)  (ΘEt0(t1)) : θ0 ∪ θ1 by (SDec) because
X  v0  (Θt0) : θ0 and X  v1  (Θt1) : θ1. Assume furthermore that (N ,V) 
Et0(t1) ∼ x, V ⊆ dom(Θ), x /∈ dom(Θ), v ∈ I(K) and N ∪ range(Θ) ⊆ I(K).
From (WH2) we now get (N ,V)  t1 ∼ x and also that fn(t0) ⊆ N ⊆ I(K) and
fv(t0) ⊆ V ⊆ dom(Θ). The latter implies that fv(Θt0) = [ ] and thus from Fact A.4
we get v0 ∈ I(K). Finally by (I3) we have v1 ∈ I(K), and the induction hypothesis
then gives us that x ∈ θ1 and θ1x ∈ I(K) which concludes the proof. 
This leads us to the main result itself, namely that (N ,V)  p ensures that the
pattern p guarantees perfect cryptography.
Theorem A.7 If (N ,V)  t  X then t  X guarantees perfect cryptography.
Proof. This is proven by induction in the structure of X :
Case [ ] is trivially true due to Deﬁnition A.2 and Fact A.3.
Case x :: X ′. Assume that (N ,V)  t  (x :: X ′) by (WPDef) because (N ,V)  t ∼ x,
(N ,V ∪ {x})  t  X ′ and x /∈ V. Now assume v and Θ where V ⊆ dom(Θ),
x /∈ dom(Θ), v ∈ I(K) and N ∪ range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) such that (x :: X ′)  v (Θt) : θ.
From Lemma A.6 we have that x ∈ dom(θ) and θx ∈ I(K) and due to Fact A.5 this
implies that X  v  (Θ′t) : θ\{x → θx} where Θ′ = Θ[x → θx]. Thus from the
induction hypothesis we get that also range(θ\{x → θx}) ⊆ I(K) and according
Deﬁnition A.2 and Fact A.3 this ensures perfect cryptography and concludes the
proof. 
A.2 Extended Model
We shall now proceed by showing that the two results also apply to the extended
model. Again in this case the ﬁrst result follows directly from the deﬁnition of the
semantics of pattern matching.
Proposition A.8 If  v  p : θ and (N ,V)  v then it follows that also ∀x ∈
dom(θ) : (N ,V)  θx.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction in the deﬁnition of Γ  v  t : θ where
each case follows directly from the induction hypothesis. 
We then introduce a new principal Ix, which similarly to I acts according to the
assumption of perfect cryptography, but in the extended model. This is captured
by the deﬁnition in Table A.2, where we merely extended the deﬁnition of I with
the rules (RI4), (RI5) and (RI7) for public key encryption and digital signatures.
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(RI1)
t ∈ K fv(t) = ∅
t ∈ Ix(K)
(RI2)
T(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ K
t1, . . . , tk ∈ Ix(K)
(RI3)
Et0 (t) ∈ K t0 ∈ K
t ∈ Ix(K)
(RI4)
Pn+ (t) ∈ K n
− ∈ K
t ∈ Ix(K)
(RI5)
Pn− (t) ∈ K n
+ ∈ K
t ∈ Ix(K)
(RI6)
t0, t ∈ K
Et0(t) ∈ Ix(K)
(RI7)
t0, t ∈ K
Pt0(t) ∈ Ix(K)
(RI8)
t1, . . . , tk ∈ K
T(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ Ix(K)
Table A.2
The knowledge of Ix; Ix(K).
We can now deﬁne how a pattern p can ensure perfect cryptography in the
extended model.
Deﬁnition A.9 The pattern t  Γ guarantees perfect cryptography if and only if
for all v and Θ where (fv(t)\dom(Γ)) ⊆ dom(Θ), range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) and v ∈ I(K)
then Γ  v  (Θt) : θ implies range(θ) ⊆ I(K).
Analogous to the basic model, we shall ﬁrst state some facts. These facts follow
directly from straightforward induction, and thus we shall omit the proofs.
Fact A.10 If Γ  v  t : θ then dom(θ) ⊆ dom(Γ).
Fact A.11 If Γ  v  t : θ where fn(t) ⊆ I(K) and fv(t) = [ ] then v ∈ I(K).
Fact A.12 If ((x → ) :: Γ)  v  t : θ and x ∈ dom(θ) then Γ  v  t[θx/x] :
θ\{x → θx}.
Fact A.13 If ((x → t′) :: Γ)  v  t : θ then Γ  v  t[t′/x] : θ\{x → θx}.
Notice the last fact, which we did not need for the basic model.
Before we proceed to the main result itself, we shall prove that (N ,V)  t ∼ x
is only satisﬁed if x can be learnt from t without violating perfect cryptography.
Lemma A.14 The judgement (N ,V)  t ∼ x ensures that for all v and Θ where
V ⊆ dom(Θ), x /∈ dom(Θ), v ∈ I(K) and N∪ range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) then Γ  v(Θt) : θ
implies x ∈ dom(θ) and θx ∈ I(K)
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction in the structure of Γ  v (Θt) : θ follows
closely the proof for Lemma A.6. In particular are the cases (RBind1) and (RBind2)
analogous to the case (Bind), and the cases (RPDec) and (RSDec) analogous to the
case (SDec), and the remaining cases are trivial. 
And now we can prove the main result that well-formedness of the patterns in
the extended model, ensures the assumption of perfect cryptography.
Theorem A.15 If (N ,V)  t  Γ then t  Γ guarantees perfect cryptography.
Proof. This is proven by induction in the structure of Γ:
Case [ ] is trivially true due to Deﬁnition A.9 and Fact A.10.
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Case (x → s) :: Γ′. Assume that (N ,V)  t  ((x → s) :: Γ′) then this may be due
to one of two rules:
Sub-case (RWDef1) because s = t′ and (N ,V)  t ∼ x, (N ,V)  t[t′/x]  Γ′.
Now assume v and Θ where V ⊆ dom(Θ), x /∈ dom(Θ), v ∈ I(K) and N ∪
range(Θ) ⊆ I(K) such that (x → t′) :: Γ′)  v(Θt) : θ. From Fact A.13 we get
Γ′  v t[t′/x] : θ\{x → θx} and thus by the induction hypothesis we get that
range(θ\{x → θx}) ∈ Ix(K) which again means that ∀x
′ ∈ fv(t′) : θx′ ∈ Ix(K),
and as we know from the recursiveness of the deﬁnition and rule (RWEmp)
that fn(t′) ⊆ N ⊆ Ix(K), we can conclude from Fact A.11 that also θx ∈ Ix(K).
Thus according to Deﬁnition A.9 and Fact A.10, we have that the pattern
ensures cryptography.
Sub-case (RWDef2) is similar to the case (WPDef) in the basic model.
And that concludes the proof.

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